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I Introduction
Numerous federal statutes authorize attorney's fees for a prevailing party.'
Prior to 2001, every federal circuit except the Fourth followed the catalyst
theory, which grants prevailing party status when a party's ends are
accomplished as a result of its lawsuit.' Under the catalyst theory courts
determined whether a party prevailed by focusing on whether the party obtained
its desired result, regardless of whether the party obtained a favorable ruling.
In Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Resources,3 the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
1. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 44-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing over
100 federal statutes authorizing fee shifting). Not all fee-shifting statutes authorize attorney's
fees for prevailing parties; some statutes authorize attorney's fees "whenever appropriate." See,
e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2000) (authorizing attorney's
fees "whenever the court determines such award is appropriate"); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(0 (2000) (same); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (2000)
(same). To date, courts considering "whenever appropriate" statutes have held that the catalyst
theory remains applicable. See Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 307 F.3d 1318, 1325
(I I th Cir. 2002) (finding Buckhannon inapplicable to "whenever appropriate" statutes); Ctr. for
Bio. Diversity v. Norton, 262 F.3d 1077, 1080 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Southwest Ctr. for Bio.
Diversity v. Carroll, 182 F. Supp. 2d 944, 947 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (same). "Whenever
appropriate" statutes do not require prevailing party status and are therefore outside the scope of
this Note.
2. See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374,
377-78 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing the catalyst theory).
3. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 605 (2001). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court considered whether a party could be
a prevailing party in the absence of a formal judicial ruling. Id. at 600. The plaintiffs in
Buckhannon operated care homes that provided assisted living to their residents. Id. The homes
failed to meet a West Virginia statute that required all residents to be able to exit the premises
without assistance in the event of a fire. Id. Pursuant to the statute, the West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources issued orders requiring the closure of the homes.
Id. The plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the state's statutory provisions violated the federal
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). Id. at
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overturned the dominant standard for determining prevailing party status and
ruled that a party cannot prevail without first prevailing in court.' After
Buckhannon, obtaining the desired result is insufficient to gain prevailing party
status.5 A party must also obtain the "necessary judicial imprimatur."6
The Court did not expressly define the required "judicial imprimatur."' In
Buckhannon, the Supreme Court analyzed its precedent and concluded that the
High Court has only held" that court-ordered consent decrees and final
judgments on the merits suffice for prevailing party status.9 Clearly, these
forms of relief can constitute sufficient judicial approval for prevailing party
status. Courts interpreting Buckhannon agree that the Supreme Court's
examples are not exclusive,"0 but find it difficult to agree on what other forms
of judicial action constitute the necessary judicial imprimatur." The circuits
particularly struggle with preliminary injunctions. 2
601. During discovery, the West Virginia legislature eliminated the challenged statutory
requirement. Id. The defendants moved to have the case dismissed as moot, and the district
court granted the motion. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that a party could not prevail without
obtaining court-ordered relief Id. at 604. In so doing, the Court emphasized that the legislative
history and public policy concerns were insufficient to overcome what the Court considered the
clear-meaning of the statutory term, "prevailing party." Id. at 607-08.
4. See id. at 605 (requiring a judicial imprimatur before a party can be considered a
prevailing party).
5. See id. (overruling the catalyst theory).
6. See id. (requiring a judicial imprimatur for prevailing party status). Webster's
Dictionary defines imprimatur as a "sanction or approval." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 626 (11 th ed. 2003).
7. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (requiring a judicial imprimatur for prevailing party status).
8. See id. (distinguishing the Supreme Court's holdings from dicta that supported the
catalyst theory).
9. See id. at 604 (analyzing Supreme Court precedent for prevailing party status).
10. See John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2003)
(noting that Buckhannon allows prevailing party status in broader circumstances than after a
final judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree); Watson v. County of Riverside,
300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (granting prevailing party status for a party that won a
preliminary injunction), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1574 (2003); Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth.,
290 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (granting prevailing party status based on a stipulated
settlement); Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2002)
(granting prevailing party status for a party that obtained its desired result through a legally
enforceable settlement agreement), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002).
11. Compare Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding the grant of a
preliminary injunction insufficient to confer prevailing party status), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 825
(2002) with Watson, 300 F.3d at 1095 (finding a preliminary injunction sufficient to confer
prevailing party status).
12. See Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277 (finding a preliminary injunction to be an insufficient
judicial imprimatur); John T., 318 F.3d at 558 (same). But see Watson, 300 F.3d at 1095
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Buckhannon engenders this difficulty by relying on two different
approaches for determining prevailing party status.'3 In recognizing a
prevailing party after a final judgment on the merits, the Court expressed
concern that the catalyst theory allowed plaintiffs to obtain attorney's fees
without demonstrating a meritorious claim. 4 In allowing prevailing party status
after a court-ordered consent decree, however, the Court was concerned, not
that the plaintiff obtain a decision on the merits, but that the desired result stem
from a court order.'3
Analysis of prevailing party status thus divides into two approaches. The
first is a means-based approach that allows prevailing party status when a party
obtains its desired result by means of a court order, as in the Court's example of
a court-ordered consent decree. 6 The second is a merit-based approach that
allows prevailing party status when there has been sufficient judicial
recognition on the merits of the plaintiff's claim, as with a final judgment on
the merits. 7
Since Buckhannon, the federal circuits have relied on both approaches.
The Ninth Circuit relies on a means-based approach and has granted prevailing
party status, not only for a party that obtained a preliminary injunction, but
also for parties that obtained court-approved settlements." The Fourth Circuit,
by contrast, relies on a merit-based approach and has refused prevailing party
status for a party that won a preliminary injunction.20 Finally, the Third Circuit
recently used a merit-based approach to deny prevailing party status to a party
(finding a preliminary injunction to be a sufficient judicial imprimatur).
13. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598,603 (2001) (analyzing prevailing party status in terms ofjudicial recognition on
the merits and the origin of the desired result).
14. See id. at 605 (finding that the catalyst theory allows prevailing party status without a
meritorious claim).
15. See id. at 604 (recognizing court-ordered consent decrees as a basis for prevailing
party status).
16. See id. (discussing court-ordered consent decrees).
17. See id. at 603-04 (discussing judgments on the merits).
18. See Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a
preliminary injunction sufficient to confer prevailing party status), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1574
(2003).
19. See Richard S. v. Dep't of Developmental Servs., 317 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir.
2003) (granting prevailing party status based on a court-approved settlement); Barrios v. Cal.
Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002) (same), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820
(2002).
20. See Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding the grant of a
preliminary injunction an insufficient judicial imprimatur to confer prevailing party status), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002).
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that won a preliminary injunction." Unlike the Fourth Circuit, which
absolutely barred prevailing party status based on a preliminary injunction,22 the
Third Circuit expressly declined to hold that a preliminary injunction was
always insufficient for prevailing party status. 3 In the Third Circuit, a party
can obtain prevailing party status based on a preliminary injunction if the
injunction involved sufficient recognition on the merits.2
As the disparate treatment indicates, preliminary injunctions pose difficult
questions when they are presented as a basis for prevailing party status. One
source of difficulty is that preliminary injunctions are interim-not final-
relief, but frequently represent the final disposition of a case; many cases are
resolved by, or soon after, a preliminary injunction." Further, while every
circuit requires a showing on the merits before granting a preliminary
injunction, the required showing varies greatly between circuits and can even
vary with the circumstances of an individual case.2" Finally, any judicial
recognition on the merits in a preliminary injunction is necessarily speculative
because the recognition occurs without the benefit of a full trial on the merits."
This Note argues that prevailing party status should be available, in
specified circumstances, for a party that obtains its desired result through a
preliminary injunction. Further, this Note analyzes the merit- and means-based
approaches for determining prevailing party status. Part II traces the history of
the term "prevailing party" beginning with a discussion of the catalyst theory
21. See John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558-59 (3d Cir. 2003)
(denying prevailing party status for a party that won a preliminary injunction because the
injunction was not granted on the merits of the claim).
22. See Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277 n.8 (finding that preliminary injunctions involve an
insufficient inquiry into the merits for prevailing party status).
23. See John T., 318 F.3d at 558 (declining to adopt the district court conclusion that
prevailing party status was only warranted after final judgments on the merits or court-ordered
consent decrees).
24. See id. at 555-58 (analyzing Buckhannon and merit-based relief as a prerequisite for
prevailing party status).
25. See, e.g., Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2002)
(analyzing prevailing party status when an action was mooted after a preliminary injunction),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1574 (2003); Smyth, 282 F.3d at 274-77 (same); Dakota Indus., Inc. v.
Ever Best Ltd., 944 F.2d 438, 440 (8th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that a preliminary injunction
functions like a permanent injunction in trademark litigation); Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v.
Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 503 (8th Cir. 1987) (same).
26. See Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 109, 111-23 (2001) (discussing the varying standards for preliminary injunctions).
27. See Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268,270-77 (4th Cir. 2002) (denying prevailing party
status for a party that won a preliminary injunction because the injunction did not represent
sufficient judicial recognition of the merits of the plaintiffs claim), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 825
(2002).
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and the circuit split that predated Buckhannon, then considering Buckhannon's
attempted resolution of the split, and finally describing some ramifications of
Buckhannon. Part I examines the circuit split that developed in the wake of
Buckhannon regarding whether a preliminary injunction can suffice for
prevailing party status. Part IV compares the merit- and means-based
approaches and concludes that the means-based approach is more equitable and
more consistent with Buckhannon. Notwithstanding this conclusion, this Note
recognizes one situation in which courts should rely on a merit-based approach.
II. Background
A. The Catalyst Theory
Prior to 1994, every federal circuit court of appeals (except the Federal
Circuit, which never addressed the issue) concluded that the catalyst theory was
an appropriate test for determining whether a party prevailed.2" The catalyst
theory posits that a party is a prevailing party if the party's lawsuit was a
catalyst for the desired change.29 Thus, under the catalyst theory, a plaintiff
prevails if the plaintiff's lawsuit causes the desired result, even if the plaintiff
achieves that result without court intervention."a For example, imagine that a
worker filed an employment discrimination suit against Widget Inc. seeking
injunctive relief to require a change in Widget Inc.'s hiring procedures. If,
faced with overwhelming evidence and certain defeat at trial, Widget Inc.
voluntarily changed its hiring procedure, the lawsuit would become moot.
Under the catalyst theory, the worker would be entitled to attorney's fees
because the lawsuit engendered the desired result.3'
28. See Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (adopting the catalyst
theory); J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1474-75 (10th Cir. 1985) (same),
abrogated by Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec'y of
Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897,910-11 (3d Cir. 1985) (same); Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d
755, 758-59 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379-80 (11th Cir. 1982)
(same); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1982) (same); Robinson v. Kimbrough,
652 F.2d 458,465 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Am. Const'al Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 187-88
(9th Cir. 1981) (same); Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(same); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979) (same), overruled by S-I & S-2 v.
State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275,
279 (1 st Cir. 1978) (same), called into doubt by Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
29. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 625-28 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing to retain the catalyst theory).
30. See id. at 605 (describing and overruling the catalyst theory).
31. See, e.g., Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (applying the
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In 1994 the Fourth Circuit ruled that the catalyst theory was no longer
viable.32 The basis of the court's ruling was dictum from the Supreme Court's
decision in Farrar v. Hobby.3 Even though Farrar did not involve a catalytic
effect, the Supreme Court stated in dictum that attorney's fees are only
appropriate when predicated on an enforceable judgment. 4 Notwithstanding
Farrar and the Fourth Circuit's ruling, nine courts of appeals affirmed their
definitions of prevailing party status and retained the catalyst theory.3" A clear
catalyst theory to determine prevailing party status); Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d 755,
758-59 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379-82 (1 Ith Cir. 1982)
(same); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1982) (same); Robinson v. Kimbrough,
652 F.2d 458,465 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199,202 (8th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam) (same).
32. See S-I and S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(finding the catalyst theory to be an inappropriate basis for prevailing party status).
33. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113-15 (1992) (holding that a plaintiff awarded
nominal damages is a prevailing party but is not automatically entitled to attorney's fees). In
Farrar, the Court considered whether a plaintiff who received nominal damages was a
prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. at 105. The plaintiff
sued for a civil rights violation, seeking $17 million in damages. Id. at 106. Ajury found that
the defendant behaved unconstitutionally, but the Fifth Circuit awarded only nominal damages.
Id. at 106-07. The Fifth Circuit further ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's
fees. Id. at 107. Upon review, the Supreme Court reasoned that the plaintiff was a prevailing
party because a judgment for damages, whether nominal or compensatory, modifies the
relationship between the parties by forcing the defendant to pay money it would not otherwise
have to pay. 1d. at 112-13. Nonetheless, the Court found that "the degree of the plaintiff's
overall success goes to the reasonableness of a fee award . . . ." Id. at 114 (quoting Tex. State
Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Ind. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793 (1989)). Thus, the Court held that
a plaintiff that received nominal damages was a prevailing party, but was not entitled to an
award of attorney's fees. Id. at 113-15. It is important to note that Farrar did not involve the
catalyst theory because the plaintiff had obtained a judgment on the merits. Id. at I 11.
34. See id. at 111-12 (synthesizing Supreme Court precedent on prevailing party status).
35. See Stanton v. S. Berkshire Reg'l Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574, 577 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999)
(retaining the catalyst theory), called into doubt by Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.
Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001); Mors v. City of West Palm Beach,
194 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11 th Cir. 1999) (same), called into doubt by Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598
(2001); Payne v. Bd. of Educ., 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1996) (same), called into doubt by
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598 (2001); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995) (same),
called into doubt by Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598 (2001); Kilgour v. City of Pasadena, 53 F.3d
1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995) (same), called into doubt by Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598 (2001);
Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 550 (3d Cir. 1994) (same), called into
doubt byBuckhannon, 532 U.S. 598 (2001); Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1994)
(same), called into doubt by Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598 (2001); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942,
951 (10th Cir. 1994) (same), called into doubt by Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598 (2001); Little
Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., #1, 17 F.3d 260, 263 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994)
(same), called into doubt by Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
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majority of circuits agreed that "[v]ictory can be achieved well short of a final
judgment. 0
6
B. Attorney's Fees and Preliminary Injunctions Prior to Buckhannon
Prior to Buckhannon, prevailing party status did not turn directly on
whether a party won a preliminary injunction. The determinative question was
whether the party obtained its desired result.a7 If a party won a preliminary
injunction but ultimately lost at trial, the party was not a prevailing party.38
However, if the preliminary injunction induced the desired result, prevailing
party status was appropriate.3 Thus, a court that awarded attorney's fees to a
party that won a preliminary injunction was not necessarily relying on the
catalyst theory. Often the party obtained relief not because its lawsuit was a
catalyst for the change, but because the order for a preliminary injunction
granted the desired result.40
36. Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224,234 (2d Cir. 1995), called into doubt by Buckhannon,
532 U.S. 598 (2001).
37. See McCafferty v. Local 254, Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 186 F.3d 52,63 n.7 (Ist
Cir. 1999) (denying attorney's fees to a party that won a preliminary injunction because of the
disparity between what plaintiff sought and what plaintiff received); Haley v. Pataki, 106 F.3d
478, 483 (2d Cir. 1997) (basing prevailing party status for a party that won a preliminary
injunction on whether the injunction resulted from a determination on the merits).
38. See LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1994) (ruling that a party that lost an
appeal on the merits could not be a prevailing party based on the grant of a preliminary
injunction); Christopher P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 805 (2d Cir. 1990) (ruling that a plaintiff
who won a temporary restraining order to maintain status quo was not a prevailing party when
the plaintiff lost an appeal on the merits).
39. See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Bissell, 210 F.3d 595,598-99(6th
Cir. 2000) (allowing attorney's fees after party won a preliminary injunction and obtained the
desired result through a declaratory judgment); Nat'l Black Police Ass'n v. D.C. Bd. of
Elections and Ethics, 168 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (granting prevailing party status to a
party that won a preliminary injunction and obtained its desired result despite the moomess of
the underlying action); Coalition for Basic Human Needs v. King, 691 F.2d 597, 601 (1 st Cir.
1982) (awarding attorney fees for a plaintiff that won a preliminary injunction even though the
underlying action was dismissed as moot).
40. See Watson v. Riverside County, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing
that a preliminary injunction granted plaintiff's desired relief), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1574
(2003). The catalyst theory could be necessary for attorney's fees even after a party wins a
preliminary injunction. If a plaintiff wins a preliminary injunction and the preliminary
injunction persuades the defendant to settle, then the plaintiff obtained its desired result because
the suit was a catalyst for change. See Bissell, 210 F.3d at 605 n.3 (relying on the catalyst
theory to uphold a district court's grant of attorney's fees after party won a preliminary
injunction and a declaratory judgment). For further discussion of the catalyst theory after a
plaintiff wins a preliminary injunction, see infra notes 221-36 and accompanying text
(discussing the means-based approach for prevailing party status).
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C. Buckhannon
In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court addressed the viability of the catalyst
theory. ' The Court considered whether a party could be a prevailing party in
the absence of a formal judicial ruling.42 The plaintiffs in Buckhannon operated
care homes that provided assisted living to their residents.43 The homes failed
to meet a West Virginia statutory requirement that all residents be able to exit
the premises without assistance in the event of a fire." Pursuant to the statute,
the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources issued orders
requiring the closure of the homes. 5 The plaintiffs brought suit alleging that
the state's statutory provisions violated the federal Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) and the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). ' The defendants
agreed to stay enforcement of the order pending resolution of the litigation.4 ,
During discovery, the West Virginia Legislature eliminated the challenged
statutory requirement. 4 The defendants moved to dismiss the case as moot.
49
The district court granted the motion. 0
Under the catalyst theory, the plaintiffs would likely have been entitled to
attorney's fees because the suit served as a catalyst for the legislative change.5
Having abandoned the catalyst theory, 2 however, the Fourth Circuit ruled that
the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties." Upon review, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision, overruled every other circuit that had
41. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001) (analyzing the catalyst theory).




46. Id. at 600-01.




51. Cf Marbleyv. Bane, 57 F.3d 224,235 (2d Cir. 1995) (allowing attorney's feesunder
the catalyst theory when the state rescinded the policy that engendered the lawsuit), called into
doubt by Buckhannon Bd. of Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598 (2001).
52. See S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994) (en bane)
(overruling the catalyst theory as a method for determining prevailing party status).
53. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
No. 99-1424,2000 WL 42250 (4th Cir. Jan. 20,2000) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs were
not prevailing parties), aff'd, 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
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addressed the issue, and ruled that the catalyst theory is not an appropriate
method for determining whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party.54
In overruling the catalyst theory, the Court considered three factors:
(1) the plain meaning of "prevailing party;"" (2) the legislative history of fee-
shifting statutes;56 and (3) policy issues for and against the catalyst theory.57
The Court first found that by its "plain meaning" the term prevailing party
required judicial action.58 The Court reached this conclusion by combining the
definition of prevailing party in Black's Law Dictionary with Supreme Court
precedent. 9 Black's defined a prevailing party as "[a] party in whose favor a
judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded."' The
Court then considered its precedent and concluded that, despite dicta
suggesting the contrary, the Court's cases had only held that plaintiffs were
entitled to attorney's fees after a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered
consent decree.6 Combining these sources, the Court determined that a party
becomes a prevailing party if "a material alteration of the legal relationship of
the parties" results from the "necessary judicial imprimatur."6 '
After defining prevailing party, the Court examined the legislative history
of fee-shifting statutes.63 Despite strong language in the House and Senate
Reports to 42 U.S.C. § 1988,' the majority concluded that the legislative
history was "at best ambiguous."65 In so doing, the Court relied on "the
American Rule that attorney's fees will not be awarded absent explicit statutory
54. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001) (concluding that the catalyst theory is not a permissible basis for
awarding attorney's fees).
55. See id. at 603 (formulating the definition of prevailing party).
56. See id. at 607-08 (discussing the legislative history of fee-shifting statutes).
57. See id. at 608-10 (discussing policy arguments).
58. See id. at 603-04 (defining prevailing party in terms of judicial action).
59. See id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY and discussing Supreme Court precedent).
60. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY I 45 (7th ed. 1999).
61. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 603-06 (2001) (analyzing relevant caselaw).
62. Id. at 604-05.
63. See id. at 607-08 (considering the legislative history under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
64. The House Report to § 1988 explains that "[tihe phrase 'prevailing party' is not
intended to be limited to the victor only after entry of a final judgment following a full trial on
the merits." H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976). The Senate Report adds that "parties may be
considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without
formally obtaining relief." S. REP. No. 94-101 , at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5908, 5912.
65. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608 (analyzing the legislative history of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988).
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authority"'  and on what the majority considered the "clear meaning" of
prevailing party.6"
Finally, the Court weighed policies for and against the catalyst theory.6"
The Court refused to decide how the policies balanced because policy could not
overcome what the majority considered "clear legislative language."'69 Based on
this language, the Court ruled that "the catalyst theory is not a permissible basis
for the award of attorney's fees under the FHAA... and ADA."7
D. Reactions to Buckhannon
The Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon substantially affected civil
rights litigation. Business owners applauded the decision, arguing that the
catalyst theory turned "frivolous... lawsuits into a cottage industry.' 1 An
attorney for the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers added, "the extortion by
plaintiff's attorneys who seek fees without winning the very case they started is
over."
7 2
Public interest groups have been less enthusiastic. By allowing attorney's
fees for prevailing parties, Congress established a "private attorney general. 73
Congress intended to encourage private litigants to enforce civil rights laws.74
66. Id. at 607-08 (comparing the legislative history to the "clear meaning" of the term
prevailing party).
67. Id. at 607 (analyzing the legislative history).
68. See id. at 608-10 (considering policy arguments).
69. See id. at 610 (declining to weigh policy arguments for and against the catalyst
theory).
70. Id. (internal quotations omitted). While Buckhannon only specifically applies to the
FHAA and ADA, courts have extended Buckhannon to other prevailing party statutes; see,e.g.,
John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that
Buckhannon applies broadly to fee-shifting statutes that use prevailing party terminology); Cody
v. Hillard, 304 F.3d 767, 773 n.3 (8th Cir. 2002) (same); Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d 1, 4
(lst Cir. 2002) (extending Buckhannon to Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976); J.C. v. Reg'l
Sch. Dist. 10, Bd. of Educ., 278 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (extending Buckhannon to
attorney's fees awarded under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act).
71. See Jack Hayes, US. Supreme Court Denies ADA Legal Fees, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEws, June 25, 2001, at 1, WL 6/25/01 NATNRSTNWS I (defending Buckhannon).
72. Tony Mauro, Supreme Court: No Fee Award Without a Ruling, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REPORT, May 31, 2001, at I (quoting Charles Newman of St. Louis office of Bryan Cave)
(discussing Buckhannon).
73. See Charles R. Haywood, Comment, The Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Shift Fees
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 985, 987-89 (1994) (describing the
purposes of fee-shifting statutes).
74. See id. at 989 (describing the purposes of fee-shifting statutes).
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Civil rights litigants fear that Buckhannon's narrow definition of a prevailing
party and elimination of the catalyst theory eviscerates the "private attorney
general" model and threatens the ability of public interest groups to bring suits
that are complex and expensive." Furthermore, attorneys argue that
Buckhannon affects trial strategies by creating an incentive for plaintiffs to seek
damages in addition to injunctive relief so that a defendant cannot unilaterally
moot an action. An attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union noted
that Buckhannon "will produce. . . two results: more litigation on collateral
issues involving attorney fees and a decrease in the amount of litigation we are
able to undertake."
7
On balance, Buckhannon's overall effect may be n.egative because
Buckhannon is unlikely to prevent meritless lawsuits and may create adverse
effects for defendants in civil rights actions. The catalyst theory did not
encourage meritless claims because a meritless lawsuit is unlikely to produce
the plaintiff's desired result.78 To be sure, a defendant may settle a lawsuit
simply to avoid the cost of contesting the suit, but the catalyst theory is often
irrelevant to this scenario because such settlements usually include an
agreement for attorney's fees."' The availability of attorney's fees may allow
plaintiffs to bring non-frivolous suits they could not otherwise afford to bring,
but this is the precise purpose of fee-shifting statutes: to encourage private
litigants to enforce civil rights laws."0
Not only is Buckhannon unlikely to prevent meritless suits, but
Buckhannon may also have an adverse effect on defendants in civil rights
litigation. The plaintiffs most affected by Buckhannon are plaintiffs that are
75. See Martin A. Schwartz, The 2000-2001 Supreme Court Term: Section 1983 Cases,
18 TOURO L. REv. 57, 74 (2001) (criticizing Buckhannon as contrary to public policy).
76. See Christopher Dunn, Recovering Attorney's Fees under "Catalyst Theory,"N.Y.L.
J., March 29, 2002, at I (describing strategies to circumnavigate Buckhannon).
77. Marcia Coyle, Fee Change is a Sea-Change But Some Seek Way to Skirt Justices'
Limit on Catalyst Theory Fees, NAT'L L. J., June II, 2001, at Al (discussing Buckhannon
(quoting Steven Shapiro, National Legal Director of ACLU)).
78. See, e.g., Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d275,279-81 (lstCir. 1978) (discussingthe
catalyst theory), abrogation recognized by Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d I (I st Cir. 2002); see
also supra Part 1.B (explaining the catalyst theory).
79. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 609 (2001) (discussing defendant's incentive to enter a settlement that includes
attorney's fees and costs); cf Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (same).
80. See Haywood, supra note 73, at 989 (discussing The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees
Award Act of 1976 and Congress's intent to encourage fee shifting statutes for the public
benefit); see also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority opinion).
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primarily seeking injunctive relief 8" In such suits, settlement (which would
allow the plaintiff to negotiate attorney's fees) is often unnecessary because the
defendant can moot the action voluntarily by altering the offensive conduct.82
In such situations, plaintiffs cannot obtain attorney's fees without the catalyst
theory. 3 As a result, plaintiffs have an increased incentive to seek damages in
addition to injunctive relief to prevent defendants from voluntarily mooting the
action." Thus, Buckhannon potentially subjects defendants to more claims for
damages and prolongs litigation that parties could otherwise resolve without
trial.8"
III. Circuit Courts' Treatment ofPrevailing Party Status Based on
Preliminary Injunctions after Buckhannon
After Buckhannon, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits considered whether a
preliminary injunction is a sufficient judicial imprimatur to warrant prevailing
party status. In Smyth v. Rivero,86 the Fourth Circuit ruled that a preliminary
injunction was insufficient to warrant prevailing party status. 7 Subsequently,
the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Watson v. County of
Riverside.8 s
A. Fourth Circuit
In Smyth, the plaintiffs were seven recipients of aid under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program, 9 The plaintiffs brought suit
alleging that a new paternity identification policy violated the Social Security
Act and the Supremacy and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States
81. See Dunn, supra note 76, at I (recognizing Buckhannon's effect on plaintiffs seeking
injunctive relief.
82. See id. (discussing the effects of Buckhannon).
83. See supra Part ll.B (explaining the catalyst theory).
84. See Dunn, supra note 76, at I (describing strategies to circumnavigate Buckhannon).
85. See id. (discussing methods to prevent defendants from voluntarily mooting actions).
86. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002).
For a detailed discussion of Smyth, see infra Part l[.A (discussing Smyth).
87. See id. at 277 (finding a preliminary injunction insufficient to warrant prevailing party
status).
88. See Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092,1093 (9th Cir. 2002) (awarding
prevailing party status to a plaintiff who won a preliminary injunction), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
1574 (2003). For a detailed discussion of Watson, see infra Part III.B (discussing Watson).
89. See Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277 (describing facts).
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Constitution." The policy required that an applicant for aid either identify the
father of the child or provide the first and last names of all potential fathers.9'
The plaintiffs alleged that they were unable to identify the fathers of their
children as required and that the Virginia Department of Social Services
(VDSS) reduced or eliminated their benefits as a result.92
The district court entered a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of
the policy against the mothers and children involved in the lawsuit.93 In
granting the injunction, the district court reasoned that the balance of harms
favored the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits.9' Subsequently, the Commissioner of VDSS (Commissioner) obtained
a waiver from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that
authorized the paternity identification policy that the Commissioner relied
upon. 95 The Commissioner then modified the identification policy so that it
applied prospectively from the time of the waiver.96 The modified
identification policy no longer applied to the plaintiffs, and the court dismissed
the case as moot.97 The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for
attorney's fees because the plaintiffs received a "'judgment against the
defendant [the preliminary injunction]' and a 'partial settlement, which
materially altered the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefited the plaintiff."'9'
After the district court's decision, but before the Fourth Circuit's appellate
review, the Supreme Court decided Buckhannon.9 In deciding Smyth, the
Fourth Circuit emphasized that the Buckhannon Court cited success on the
merits as a prerequisite to prevailing party status and that the Court stressed that
preliminary successes did not equate to legal victories."° The Fourth Circuit
determined that the grant of a preliminary injunction was equivalent to the
90. Id. at 271.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 272.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 273-74 (quoting the district court).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 274.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 275-76 (analyzing Buckhannon); see also Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-05 (2001) (considering the
character ofjudicial relief necessary for prevailing party status).
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preliminary successes deemed insufficient in Buckhannon.' The court
acknowledged that granting a preliminary injunction required consideration of
the merits.'0 2 However, the court reasoned that the consideration was
necessarily abbreviated because a party seeking a preliminary injunction must
show only a strong or substantial likelihood of success by clear and convincing
evidence."0 3 The district court's consideration of the merits was not a final
determination, but merely a prediction of an uncertain outcome."
Moreover, courts-in every circuit-consider factors other than the
likelihood of success on the merits when granting a preliminary injunction."°'
For instance, in the Fourth Circuit, a high likelihood of substantial harm
justifies the grant of a preliminary injunction with a lesser showing on the
merits."° Thus, the showing of a likelihood of success on the merits can vary
with the balance of harms.'0 7  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
consideration of the balance of harms makes the preliminary injunction an
unreliable indicator of success on the merits, and therefore an inappropriate
basis for prevailing party status.1
0 8
In reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the Smyth
decision did not turn on the Fourth Circuit's own standard for preliminary
101. See Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding preliminary
injunctions to be an insufficient basis for prevailing party status after Ruckhannon), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 825 (2002).
102. See id. (discussing whether winning a preliminary injunction can be sufficient to
warrant prevailing party status (citing Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville v. Seilig Mfg.
Co., 550 F.2d 189, 196 (4th Cir. 1977))).
103. See id. (considering the standard for a preliminary injunction (citing MicroStrategy,
Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001))).
104. See id. (comparing the inquiry into the merits for a grant of a preliminary injunction to
the inquiry necessary for prevailing party status under Buckhannon).
105. See id. (analyzing whether winning a preliminary injunction can warrant prevailing
party status (citing Safety-Kleen, Inc. (Pinewood) v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 858-59 (4th Cir.
2001))). For a survey of the different standards for preliminary injunctions across the federal
circuits, see infra Part IV.B (surveying the standards for preliminary injunctions across the
federal circuits).
106. See Safety-Kleen, Inc. (Pinewood) v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 858-59 (4th Cir. 2001)
(listing the likelihood of irreparable harm as the first factor considered for a preliminary
injunction).
107. See Ciena Corp. v. Jarrard, 203 F.3d 312, 323 (4th Cir. 2000) (analyzing the
relationship between considerations of the likelihood of success and the balance of harms in a
preliminary injunction inquiry).
108. See Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing the
inquiry for a preliminary injunction from the inquiry involved with a final judgment on the
merits), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002).
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injunctions nor on the circumstances of the injunction at issue."° Regarding
the former, the court noted that " [t]he preliminary injunction inquiry, because
of the preliminary, incomplete examination of the merits involved and the
incorporation (if not the predominance) of equitable factors, is ill-suited to
guide the prevailing party determination regardless of how it is formulated."'°
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that some preliminary
injunctions justify an award of attorney's fees even if others do not."'
B. Ninth Circuit
In Watson, the Ninth Circuit ruled that-despite Buckhannon-a party
who won a preliminary injunction was a prevailing party."2 The plaintiff in
Watson was a former Riverside County deputy sheriff suspected of using
excessive force during a highly publicized arrest. " After the arrest, officers at
the station ordered Watson to prepare a report of the incident." 4 The police
department ultimately terminated Watson for his conduct during the arrest. 5
Watson alleged that various state officers violated his constitutional rights
by detaining him, forcing him to write the report, and refusing to allow him to
speak to an attorney or representative of his employee organization prior to
writing the report."" Watson sought money damages and an injunction
enjoining the police department from using the report in an administrative
hearing to appeal Watson's termination. "' After finding that Watson had some
likelihood of success on the merits, the trial judge granted Watson a
preliminary injunction enjoining the use of the report at the administrative
hearing.' Two years after the trial judge granted the injunction, the district
109. See id. at 277 nn. 8-9 (noting that the insufficiency of a preliminary injunction for
prevailing party status is not dependent on the Fourth Circuit test for a preliminary injunction or
on the circumstances of the present injunction).
110. Id.at277n.8.
111. See id. at 277-78 (refusing to distinguish plaintiff's injunction from a situation where
plaintiff wins a preliminary injunction but ultimately loses on the merits).
112. See Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002) (affording
prevailing party status to a plaintiff who won a preliminary injunction but lost the suit), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1574 (2003).
113. Id.
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court granted the police department's motion for summary judgment regarding
all of Watson's claims except his claim of a due process violation in obtaining
the report." 9  However, because the parties had already concluded the
administrative appeal and excluded the incident report per the preliminary
injunction, both parties agreed that the underlying permanent injunction was
moot. 2° Thus, the only claim remaining was Watson's claim for attorney's
fees.' 2' The district court granted the claim.'22
The Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's award of attorney's fees.'23 In so
doing, the court emphasized that Watson's lawsuit did not seek Watson's
reinstatement, but sought to exclude the incident report from the administrative
hearing.'24 Thus, by winning the preliminary injunction, Watson obtained the
precise result that he sought.'25 The court then distinguished Buckhannon
because Watson's case did not involve the catalyst theory."' The police
department did not exclude the incident report voluntarily; they excluded it
because the trial court ordered them to do so. '27 Finally, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that a preliminary injunction was a sufficient judicial imprimatur to justify an
award of attorney's fees.' 28 The court determined that the Supreme Court's
requirements of a final judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent
decree were examples of sufficient judicial oversight and were not an
exhaustive list of the judicial orders that would suffice.'29
IV Discussion
A. Buckhannon's Dual Approach: Recognition on the Merits or Court-
Ordered Relief
As Watson and Smyth demonstrate, it is unclear from Buckhannon






124. Id. at 1095.
125. Id.
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status. 30 The circuit split created by Watson and Smyth results from different
interpretations of Buckhannon. In Watson, the Ninth Circuit relied on a means-
based approach and granted prevailing party status for a party that won a
preliminary injunction because the party's relief stemmed from the preliminary
injunction.' 3 ' In Smyth, the Fourth Circuit relied on a merit-based approach and
denied prevailing party status because the preliminary injunction did not
constitute sufficient judicial recognition on the merits.3 2 Thus, Watson focused
on how the plaintiff obtained its desired result and Smyth focused on whether
the desired result was accompanied by significant judicial recognition on the
merits. "'33
Whether courts should apply a merit- or means-based approach depends
on the definition of the judicial imprimatur required by Buckhannon.34 The
Fourth Circuit considered the imprimatur to be a court order based on the
merits of the plaintiff's claim.' The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
considered the imprimatur to be a court order that granted the plaintiff's desired
relief.36 The distinction between these approaches illustrates the distinction
between a means-based and a merit-based approach. Under the Fourth
Circuit's merit-based approach, prevailing party status is justified if a plaintiff
obtains a court order that involves sufficient judicial consideration of the merits
of its claim.' By contrast, under the Ninth Circuit's means-based approach,
130. Compare Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268,277 (4th Cir. 2002) (relying on Buckhannon
to rule that prevailing party status is not justified based on a preliminary injunction), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002) with Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092,1096 (9th Cir.
2002) (distinguishing Buckhannon to allow prevailing party status based on a preliminary
injunction), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1574 (2003).
131. See Watson, 300 F.3d at 1096 (granting prevailing party status based on a preliminary
injunction because the preliminary injunction granted plaintiff's desired result).
132. See Smyth, 282 F.3d at 276 (ruling that a preliminary injunction is too preliminary in
nature to justify award of attorney's fees).
133. Compare Watson, 300 F.3d at 1096 (granting prevailing party status based on a
preliminary injunction) with Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277 (denying prevailing party status based on a
preliminary injunction).
134. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (requiring a judicial imprimatur for prevailing party status).
135. Cf. Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277 (denying prevailing party status to a party that won a
preliminary injunction because preliminary injunctions do not constitute sufficient judicial
recognition on the merits of plaintiff's claim).
136. See Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (granting
prevailing party status to a plaintiff that obtained its desired result directly from a preliminary
injunction), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1574 (2003).
137. See John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545,558-59 (3d Cir. 2003)
(denying prevailing party status to a plaintiff that won a preliminary injunction because the
preliminary injunction was not based on the merits of the claim); cf Smyth, 282 F.3d at 276
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prevailing party status is justified if the party obtains its desired result from a
court order. 3 '
Despite language in Buckhannon that endorses a merit-based approach,
close analysis of Buckhannon supports the Ninth Circuit's means-based
approach. In overruling the catalyst theory, the Court wrote, "[a] defendant's
voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff
sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the
change.'.39 The Court further noted that surviving a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim or lack ofjurisdiction was likewise insufficient.'" In so
holding, the Court implied that, in such cases, a plaintiff fails to obtain judicial
recognition on the merits of its claim. 4' The Court wrote: "[the catalyst
theory] allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the
legal relationship of the parties .... [A] plaintiff could recover attorney's fees
if it established that the complaint had sufficient merit to withstand a motion to
dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction or failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted."'4 Thus, in overruling the catalyst theory, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the theory allowed plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees without
demonstrating that their complaint had sufficient merit.' Moreover,
(considering the requirements for prevailing party status after Buckhannon). An obvious
problem with the merit-based approach is determining what degree of recognition on the merits
of a plaintiff's suit is sufficient. For a detailed discussion of this problem, see infra Part IV.C
(discussing the problems with the merit-based approach).
138. See Watson, 300 F.3d at 1096 (analyzing the requirements for prevailing party status
after Buckhannon). A means-based approach grants prevailing party status when a party obtains
its desired result. The approach does not, however, address the underlying question of whether
the court-ordered relief the plaintiff obtained constituted the desired result. The Supreme Court
prescribed a two-step process for calculating attorney's fees in case of partial or limited success.
See Hensley v. Eckerhaft, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (discussing the appropriateness of
attorney's fees for a party that obtained limited success). A court must consider (1) whether
"the plaintiff fail[ed] to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he
succeeded," and (2) whether "the plaintiff achiev[ed] a level of success that makes the hours
reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award." Id. at 434. Further, the
district court, can, within its discretion, make deductions based on limited success. See
Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140,1 147 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing the availability of attorney's
fees for plaintiffs that obtained limited success). Issues of partial or limited success are inherent
in all prevailing party analysis and are not addressed by the means-based approach. As such,
they are outside the scope of this Note.
139. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
140. See id. (finding prevailing party status inappropriate for surviving a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim for lack of jurisdiction).
141. See id. (discussing the inappropriateness of catalyst theory as a basis for prevailing
party status).
142. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Brief for United States Amicus Curiae at 27).
143. See id. (overruling the catalyst theory).
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Buckhannon can be read to imply that the Supreme Court did not intend to
allow prevailing party status based on a preliminary injunction.'" The Court
defined the requisite judicial imprimatur by citing court-ordered consent
decrees and final judgments on the merits."' By exclusion, a preliminary
injunction would not apply.
The Third and Fourth Circuits relied on this interpretation of Buckhannon
and applied a merit-based analysis to deny prevailing party status to parties that
obtained their desired result from preliminary injunctions.' In Smyth, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that prevailing party status is inappropriate based on a
preliminary injunction because courts grant preliminary injunctions based on
considerations such as a balance of harms favoring the plaintiff or public policy
and need not consider the underlying merits. "7 Similarly, the Third Circuit, in
John T. v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit,"8 recently concluded that
prevailing party status was inappropriate for a party that won a preliminary
injunction when the preliminary injunction was not based on the merits of the
claim." 9
144. See id. at 603-04 (analyzing Supreme Court precedent to determine when prevailing
party status is appropriate).
145. See id. (recognizing past justifications for prevailing party status).
146. See John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558-59 (3d Cir. 2003)
(finding that preliminary injunctions lack sufficient inquiry into the merits to justify prevailing
party status); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268,277 (4th Cir. 2002) (same), cert denied, 537 U.S.
825 (2002).
147. See Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277 (finding preliminary injunction inquiries into the balance
of harms and the merits of plaintiffs claims insufficient to justify prevailing party status). For a
survey of the federal circuit courts' standards for preliminary injunctions, see infra Part IV.B
(surveying the standards for preliminary injunctions across federal circuits).
148. John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2003). In John T,
plaintiff, a twelve-year-old child with Downs Syndrome, brought suit under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) against the Delaware County Intermediate Unit (DCIU), a
Pennsylvania state agency charged that provides special education services to children with
disabilities in Delaware County. Id. at 548-49. The plaintiff alleged that while the agency
offered to provide services at a public school it refused to provide them at the private school that
the plaintiff attended. Id. at 549. The plaintiff sought (1) compensation for costs of services
and programs paid for by plaintiff, (2) payment of future costs of services and programs, and
(3) a due process hearing as required by the IDEA. Id. After a hearing, the district court
granted a preliminary injunction, which ordered DCIU to "provide John T. [the plaintiff] with
speech therapy, occupational therapy, a teacher's aide, and an itinerant teacher." Id. The
plaintiff then moved for, and was denied, attorney's fees. On appeal, the Third Circuit
confirmed the denial of attorney's fees. Id. at 558. The Third Circuit reasoned that Buckhannon
applies to the IDEA, and further, that the preliminary injunction received by the plaintiffdid not
amount to relief on the merits of the plaintiffs claim and was therefore an inappropriate basis
for attorney's fees after Buckhannon. Id. at 556-59.
149. See id. at 558-59 (refusing prevailing party status for a party that won a preliminary
injunction where the preliminary injunction was not based on the merits of the claim).
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Such a conclusion, however, does not square with the Supreme Court's
recognition that a court-ordered consent decree is an appropriate basis for
prevailing party status.' The Court noted, "[a]lthough a consent decree does
not always include an admission of liability by the defendant, it nonetheless is a
court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant."'' Further, the Court added, "never have we awarded attorney's
fees for a nonjudicial alteration of actual circumstances.". 2 Thus, a consent
decree is an appropriate basis for prevailing party status, not because it involves
judicial recognition on the merits of the plaintiff's claim, but because the
desired result is granted by a court order. "3
The Supreme Court's specific reference to final judgments on the merits
and court-ordered consent decrees is insufficient to preclude prevailing party
status based on a preliminary injunction."" Lower courts can interpret the
Court's references to final judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent
decrees as examples rather than as requirements; the Court stops short of stating
that prevailing party status is unobtainable based on other forms of court-
ordered relief.' Furthermore, in contrast to a final judgment, a court-ordered
consent decree does not involve an inquiry into the merits. s6 Both a final
150. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (discussing the appropriate basis for prevailing party status).
151. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist.,
489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989)).
152. Id. at 606 (emphasis added) (quoting Justice Ginsburg's dissent).
153. Cf Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989)
(allowing prevailing party status because the desired result stemmed from a court order); Maher
v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (same); Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092,
1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (same), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1574 (2003).
154. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-04 (recognizing final judgments on the merits and
court-ordered consent decrees as appropriate bases for prevailing party status); see also John T.
v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2003) (declining to accept the
district court suggestion that Buckhannon only allows prevailing party status for a party that
obtains a final judgment on merits ora court-ordered consent decree); Watson, 300 F.3d at 1096
(granting prevailing party status for a party that won a preliminary injunction); Barrios v. Cal.
Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002) (granting prevailing party status for
a party that obtained its desired result through a court-approved settlement), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 820 (2002); Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (granting
prevailing party status based on a stipulated settlement).
155. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 (citing examples of relief that are appropriate for
prevailing party status).
156. See United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir.1990) (explaining that a
consent decree is "not a decision on the merits ... but [is] the product of negotiation and
compromise" (citing United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971))); see also
Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C. L. Rav.
291, 322 (1988) (explaining that the "district court, in approving a consent decree, is not
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judgment and a court-ordered consent decree, however, involve relief that
stems from a court order.'57 Thus, it is logical to extend the examples to other
forms of relief that enforce the plaintiff's desired result, like preliminary
injunctions. Finally, the examples of consent decrees and final judgments on
the merits are unpersuasive as exclusive requirements because they are dicta.'
In Buckhannon, Justice Scalia apologized to the circuits for dicta from
Supreme Court opinions that induced reliance on the catalyst theory.'59 Scalia's
apology suggests that the circuits should not be compelled by further dicta.
Appropriately, the circuits that considered Buckhannon found final judgments
and court-ordered consent decrees to be examples of acceptable relief and not
the only appropriate forms. 60
Taken in full, Buckhannon does not require judicial recognition on the
merits, but that the desired result stems from a court order. 6' Consent decrees
and final judgments on the merits do not involve similar degrees of recognition
on the merits.'62 They do, however, both involve judicial oversight and judicial
enforcement of a court order. 3 Thus, the judicial imprimatur required by
remedying a wrong. Except in rare instances, neither party has admitted liability.").
157. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text (comparing the merit-and means-
based approaches for determining prevailing party status).
158. See Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002)
(labeling Buckhannon's reference to court-ordered consent decrees and final judgments on the
merits as dicta), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002).
159. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 621 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (apologizing for dicta in past decisions that
confirmed the viability of the catalyst theory).
160. See John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556 (3d Cir. 2003)
(noting that Buckhannon allows prevailing party status in broader circumstances than after a
final judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree); Watson v. County of Riverside,
300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (granting prevailing party status for a party that won a
preliminary injunction and stating that "[]udgments and consent decrees are examples of
[judicial imprimaturs], but.., not the only examples"), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1574 (2003);
Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134 (granting prevailing party status for a party that obtained its desired
result through a court-ordered consent decree), cert denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002); Truesdell v.
Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (granting prevailing party status based on
a stipulated settlement).
161. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-05 (discussing the requirements for prevailing party
status); see also supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text (describing the merit- and means-
based tests for prevailing party status).
162. See United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that a
consent decree is "not a decision on the merits.., but the product of negotiation and
compromise" (citing United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971))); see also
Mengler, supra note 156, at 322 (explaining that the "district court, in approving a consent
decree, is not remedying a wrong. Except in rare instances, neither party has admitted
liability.").
163. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (finding that enforceable judgments on the merits
PRELIMINAR Y IMPRIMA TURS
Buckhannon is satisfied, not by recognition of the merits, but by obtaining
relief through an enforceable judgment from a court. Preliminary injunctions,
like final judgments or court-ordered consent decrees, are enforceable
judgments."'4 As such, a preliminary injunction can be a proper basis for
attorney's fees after Buckhannon.'65
B. Differing Standards for a Preliminary Injunction and a
Merit-Based Analysis
If courts adopt a merit-based approach to prevailing party status, courts
will have to determine how strong a showing on the merits a party must
make.'66 One possibility is to require a final judgment on the merits. This
requirement, however, is draconian and would create an inefficient incentive
for plaintiffs to force judicial proceedings to a final conclusion.'67 Furthermore,
the majority of lawsuits settle or become moot before reaching a final judgment
on the merits.'68 If courts refuse to allow attorney's fees in all such cases, they
will thwart the legislative intention of allowing private litigants to enforce civil
rights laws."'69 Finally, requiring a final judgment on the merits is inconsistent
and consent decrees materially alter the legal relationships of the parties); United States v;
Oregon, 913 F.2d at 580 (discussing court-ordered consent decrees).
164. See Watson, 300 F.3d at 1096 (discussing preliminary injunctions). Frequently, a
preliminary injunction only constitutes interim relief. Prevailing party status is onlyjustified
under a means-based approach when the injunction is not dissolved or supplanted by a later
ruling. For a discussion of these issues, see supra Part IV.E (discussing the means-based
approach as applied to interim relief).
165. See Watson, 300 F.3d at 1096 (allowing prevailing party status based on a preliminary
injunction); see also infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text (discussing the means-based
approach for granting prevailing party status).
166. Cf Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that preliminary
injunctions involve an insufficient showing on the merits to justify prevailing party status), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002).
167. See Dunn, supra note 76, at I (discussing plaintiffs' strategies after the loss of the
catalyst theory).
168. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 311 (5th ed. 2000) (noting that most civil
lawsuits are resolved before trial); see also Table C-5, U.S. District Courts-Time Intervals
from Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Method of Disposition,
During the Twelve-Month Period Ending September 30, 1998, http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt
98/cO5sep98.pdf (indicating that over 90% of lawsuits are resolved without trial) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
169. See Haywood, supra note 73, at 987-89 (discussing Congress's rationale for the
private attorney general model in fee-shifting statutes).
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with Buckhannon's recognition that consent decrees are sufficient for prevailing
party status.
170
In lieu of requiring a final judgment on the merits, courts could insist on a
lesser showing on the merits. Such an approach would be particularly problematic
in the context of a preliminary injunction because the standards for granting a
preliminary injunction vary across circuits. 171 Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure addresses preliminary injunctions, but does not specify standards to guide
a court in deciding when to grant a preliminary injunction. 72  Likewise, the
Supreme Court has never specified a clear standard. 7 In general, the circuits agree
that the relevant factors include: (1) likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) irreparable harm to the moving party if the injunction is denied; (3) irreparable
harm to the non-moving party if the injunction is granted; and (4) the public
interest. 174 Despite recognizing similar standards, the weight and the method of
analyzing each factor varies significantly between circuits.
71
170. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (recognizing consent decrees as an appropriate basis for prevailing
party status).
171. See, e.g., AI-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (detailing the
standards for granting a preliminary injunction in the D.C. Circuit); Zervos v. Verizon N.Y.,
Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) (same for the Second Circuit); Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group,
Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895-96 (7th Cir. 2001) (same for the Seventh Circuit); Adams v. Freedom
Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475,484 (3d Cir. 2000) (same for the Third Circuit); cf Morton Denlow,
Preliminary Injunctions: Look before You Leap, LITIGATION, Summer 2002, at 8, 9-10
(discussing the effect of various standards for preliminary injunctions across the circuits on
plaintiffs' decisions on whether to seek a preliminary injunction).
172. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (stating the federal rules for preliminary injunctions).
173. See Denlow, supra note 171, at 9 (discussing the lack of clear standards for granting a
preliminary injunction).
174. See, e.g., Ciena Corp. v. Jarrard, 203 F.3d 312, 322 (4th Cir. 2000) (indicating that
trial courts must consider: (I) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm to
the movant; (3) irreparable harm to the non-movant; and (4) the public interest); Pitt News v.
Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 365-66 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); Entergy, Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d
887, 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 191 F.3d 1224,1230 (10th
Cir. 1999) (same); Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11 th Cir. 1999) (same); Connection
Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); Platinum Home Mortgage Co.
v. Platinum Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 1998) (same); Ross-Simons of
Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 15 (1 st Cir. 1996) (same); Tom Doherty Assocs. v.
Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27,33 (2d. Cir. 1995) (same); Doev. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist.,
994 F.2d 160,163 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Nutri-Cology, Inc., 982
F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992) (same).
175. See, e.g., AI-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300,303 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying a four-part
test for granting a preliminary injunction); Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 172 (2d
Cir. 200 1) (applying a two-part test); Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir.
2001) (applying a sliding-scale approach for granting a preliminary injunction); Adams v.
Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475,484 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying a two-part test that allows for
the consideration of other relevant factors).
950
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Every circuit considers a party's likelihood of success on the merits before
granting a preliminary injunction, but the amount of weight given the factor
varies substantially." 6 The weight varies from a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits,' to reasonable certainty of success,' to a probability of
success, 79 to substantial questions going to the merits,' to a fair question
going to the merits,'18 to a negligible showing on the merits. ' A summary of
the different standards used to grant a preliminary injunction in federal courts
follows.
1. D. C. Circuit-Traditional Four-Part Test
The D.C. Circuit uses a traditional four-part test.' Before granting a
preliminary injunction, the D.C. Circuit requires that the moving party show
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury if the
injunction is not granted; (3) that the injunction will not substantially injure
other interested parties; and (4) that the injunction will further the public's
interests. 84
2. Second Circuit-Two-Part Test
To obtain a preliminary injunction in the Second Circuit, a plaintiff must
show (a) irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction and (b) either (i) a
likelihood of success on the merits, or (ii) sufficiently serious questions going
176. See Lee, supra note 26, at 111-23 (discussing the varying standards for preliminary
injunctions).
177. See AI-Fayed, 254 F.3d at 303 (requiring a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits before granting a preliminary injunction).
178. See Robinswood Cmty. Club v. Volpe, 506 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1974)
(requiring a strong likelihood or reasonable certainty of success on the merits).
179. See Adams, 204 F.3d at 484 (3d Cir. 2000) (requiring a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits).
180. See Zervos, 252 F.3d at 172 (requiring sufficiently serious questions on the merits to
make them fair grounds for litigation or a likelihood of success on merits).
181. See Brandeis Mach. & Supply Corp. v. Barber-Greene Co., 503 F.2d 503, 505 (6th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (requiring a fair question going to the merits for grant of a preliminary
injunction).
182. See Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895-96 (7th Cir. 2001) (requiring
some likelihood of success on the merits).
183. See AI-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (laying out the D.C.
Circuit's test for preliminary injunctions).
184. See id. (listing the factors for a preliminary injunction).
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to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of
hardships tipping decidedly toward the plaintiff.'
3. Third Circuit
In the Third Circuit, a party must show both a likelihood of success on the
merits and a probability of immediate and irreparable harm if the injunction is
denied.'86 If relevant, the district court should also examine the likelihood of
irreparable harm to the non-moving party and whether the injunction serves the
public interest.87
4. Fourth Circuit-Balance of Hardship Test
In the Fourth Circuit, the trial court must first determine whether the
plaintiff has made a strong showing of irreparable harm if the injunction is
denied.'88 If the plaintiff makes the showing, the court must balance the
likelihood of harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied against the
likelihood of harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted. 89 If the
balance of harms tips decidedly in the plaintiff's favor, then typically it will "be
enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious,
substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for litigation
and thus for more deliberate investigation."'" If the balance of hardships is
substantially equal between the plaintiff and defendant, then "the probability of
success begins to assume real significance, and interim relief is more likely to
require a clear showing of a likelihood of success. "'' Thus, the importance of
185. See Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) (listing factors for
a preliminary injunction).
186. See Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475,484 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing the
Third Circuit's test for granting a preliminary injunction).
187. See id. (discussing the standard for granting a preliminary injunction).
188. See Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating the
Fourth Circuit's standard for a preliminary injunction); Blackwelder Furniture Co. of
Statesville, Inc. v. Selig Mfg. Co. 550 F.2d 189, 195 (4th Cir. 1977) (same).
189. See Scotts Co., 315 F.3d at 271 (discussing the standard for preliminary injunction);
Safety-Kleen, Inc. (Pinewood) v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 858-59 (4th Cir. 2001) (same);
Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195 (same).
190. Scotts Co., 315 F.3d at 271 (quoting Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195).
191. 1d. (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 808 (4th
Cir. 1991)).
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the probability of success on the merits increases as the probability of
irreparable harm decreases.'92
5. Seventh Circuit-The Sliding Scale Approach
In the Seventh Circuit a party moving for a preliminary injunction must
demonstrate that (1) the case has some likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) no adequate remedy at law exists; and (3) the movant will suffer irreparable
harm if the injunction is denied.'93 If the plaintiff satisfies these three factors,
then the court also considers the possibility of irreparable harm to the non-
moving party if preliminary relief is granted.'9 Finally, the court considers
public factors involved in granting or denying the injunction.'95 The court then
balances the factors using a sliding scale approach." The more likely the
movant is to succeed on the merits, the less the balance of irreparable harms
needs to favor the movant's position. 97 By contrast, if the balance of
irreparable harms clearly favors the movant, then the court requires a lesser
showing on the merits.' Under this approach, a movant may need to
demonstrate only a "better than negligible chance of success on the merits."'"
6. Ninth Circuit
In the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must meet
one of two tests.' Under the first test, a trial court may issue a preliminary
injunction if the court finds that: (1) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury
if the injunction is not granted; (2) the plaintiff will probably prevail on the
merits; (3) the balance of harms favors the plaintiff; and (4) granting the
192. See Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195 (discussing the standard for a preliminary
injunction).
193. See Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895-96 (7th Cir. 2001) (listing the
factors for granting a preliminary injunction).




198. Id. at 895-96.
199. Id. at 896 (quoting the magistrate judge's findings).
200. See Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313,1319 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating the Ninth
Circuit's standard for granting a preliminary injunction); Martin v. Int'l Olympic Comm., 740
F.2d 670, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).
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injunction is in the public interest.2"' Under the second test, a trial court may issue an
injunction if the plaintiff demonstrates either a combination of probable success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions on the merits
are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor.202 Finally,
the Ninth Circuit discourages preliminary relief that goes beyond maintaining the
status quo.
203
C. Problems with the Merit-Based Approach When a Party Wins a Preliminary
Injunction
As the above summary indicates, a preliminary injunction may involve varying
degrees of recognition on the merits." * If courts require a showing on the merits for
prevailing party status and make the threshold showing lower than a full trial on the
merits, courts will have difficulty determining when the varying standard for obtaining
a preliminary injunction satisfies the threshold for prevailing party status. Courts can
remedy this problem with several possible solutions, but each is problematic.
One solution is to rule, as the Fourth Circuit did in Smyth, that winning a
preliminary injunction is never sufficient for prevailing party status. 201 Such a ruling,
however, prevents a plaintiff from recovering attorney's fees even when the plaintiff
wins a preliminary injunction, demonstrates a meritorious claim, and obtains its
desired result.2" Many preliminary injunctions, particularly in trademark cases or in
cases where the court consolidates the injunction and the trial on the merits, are the end
of litigation.20 7 An absolute bar against awarding attorney's fees based on
preliminary injunctions punishes plaintiffs with strong suits simply because
further litigation was unnecessary.
201. See Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1319 (stating the Ninth Circuit's standard for granting a
preliminary injunction).
202. See id. (stating the standard for a preliminary injunction).
203. See id. (stating the standard for a preliminary injunction); see also Lee, supra note 26,
at 115 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's heightened standard for preliminary injunctions when the
movant seeks to upset the status quo).
204. See supra Part IV.B (describing the standards across the circuits for preliminary
injunctions).
205. See Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that a preliminary
injunction does not involve enough recognition on the merits to warrant prevailing party status),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002); see also supra Part 1.A (discussing Smyth).
206. See Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277 (denying prevailing party status to a party that won a
preliminary injunction and obtained its desired result).
207. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(2) (discussing consolidation of a preliminary injunction hearing
with a trial on the merits); see also Denlow, supra note 171, at 9-10 (discussing the
considerations involved in deciding to pursue a preliminary injunction).
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An alternative to the absolute bar is to require the trial court to make a
specific finding on the likelihood of success on the merits when a plaintiff
seeks a preliminary injunction and attorney's fees. Under such an approach,
prevailing party status would be available to a plaintiff that obtained its desired
result by virtue of a preliminary injunction and received a district court's
finding that the plaintiffdemonstrated the requisite likelihood of success on the
merits (for example, a substantial likelihood of success on the merits).2°8 In
jurisdictions that require a substantial likelihood of success on the merits to win
a preliminary injunction, no additional finding would be necessary; obtaining a
preliminary injunction would necessarily demonstrate the requisite showing on
the merits."° By contrast, ajurisdiction that grants preliminary injunctions with
a showing on the merits below the requisite showing could grant a preliminary
injunction but deny prevailing party status because the plaintiff made an
insufficient showing on the merits. ' °
To illustrate this last point, imagine that the requisite showing on the
merits for prevailing party status is deemed to be a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits."' Imagine further that a plaintiff seeks a preliminary
injunction in the Seventh Circuit, where a preliminary injunction can be
granted with a showing of "some likelihood of success on the merits." 1 ' If a
trial court in the Seventh Circuit finds that the plaintiff demonstrates some
likelihood of success on the merits, but fails to demonstrate a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits, the court would be justified in granting the
preliminary injunction and refusing prevailing party status.2"3
208. Cf Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277 (finding that preliminary injunctions do not constitute
enough judicial recognition on the merits for prevailing party status).
209. Cf AI-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (requiring a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits for a preliminary injunction in the D.C. Circuit).
210. Cf Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) (requiring
sufficiently serious questions on the merits); Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895
(7th Cir. 2001) (requiring better than negligible chance of success on the merits); Adams v.
Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475,484 (3d Cir. 2000) (requiring a likelihood of success on
the merits); Brandeis Mach. and Supply Co. v. Barber-Greene Co., 503 F.2d 503, 505 (6th Cir.
1974) (per curiam) (requiring a fair question going to the merits for grant of a preliminary
injunction); Robinswood Comm. Club v. Volpe, 506 F.2d 1366,1368 (9th Cir. 1974) (requiring
a strong likelihood or a reasonable certainty of success on the merits to make them sufficient
grounds for litigation or a likelihood of success on the merits).
211. I selected "a substantial likelihood of success" simply for the purpose of illustration.
The arbitrariness of this selection highlights a major drawback of the merit-based approach for
determining prevailing party status. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text (discussing
the drawbacks of the merit-based approach).
212. See Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001) (listing the
factors for granting a preliminary injunction).
213. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (describing the Seventh Circuit's
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Requiring the trial court to make a specific finding on the merits is
problematic for several reasons. First, asking trial courts to make an additional
finding will inevitably require more time because a specific finding on the
merits requires a more thorough inquiry into the merits. In addition to
consuming judicial resources, the inquiry could delay the ultimate grant of the
preliminary injunction, which may cause additional injury to the movant, a
party that is likely faced with exigent circumstances." 4 Furthermore, regardless
of any additional inquiry the trial court makes, any findings on the merits will
be necessarily speculative."1 5 A likelihood of success on the merits is simply
not the same as success on the merits. 26 A trial judge cannot always know the
strength of a plaintiffs case without the benefit of a trial.2"7 Finally, any
threshold requirement is arbitrary; nothing in the prevailing party statutes
suggests what the threshold should be, and no particular threshold is more
logical than another.2t8
D. Means-Based Analysis: Obtaining Relieffrom a Court Order
As demonstrated above, the merit-based approach is problematic as
applied to preliminary injunctions.219 Rather than outright denying attorney's
standard for granting preliminary injunctions).
214. See, e.g., Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) (recognizing exigent
circumstances for plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction); Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic
Fed'n, No. 92-3596, 1992 WL 157545, at *1 (6th Cir. Jul. 19, 1992) (unpublished table
decision) (same); Am. Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imps., Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1147 (1986)
(recognizing that preliminary injunctions frequently involve exigent circumstances); Ideal Toy
Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1982) (same).
215. See Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2002) (deeming preliminary
injunctions an insufficient basis for prevailing party status because any recognition on the merits
is speculative), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002); MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245
F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that preliminary injunctions involve speculative
consideration of the merits).
216. See Smyth, 282 F.3d at 276 (finding a preliminary injunction to be an abbreviated
discussion of the merits); MicroStrategy, 245 F.3d at 339 (same).
217. See Smyth, 282 F.3d at 276 (describing preliminary injunctions as an abbreviated
discussion of the merits); MicroStrategy, 245 F.3d at 339 (same); cf I IA CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC.: CIVIL 2D § 2948.3 (1995) ("All courts agree that plaintiff
must present a prima facie case but need not show that he is certain to win.").
218. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(2000) (allowing attorney's fees for a prevailing party); Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. § 145 1(e) (2000) (same); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613(c)(2) (2000) (same).
219. See Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277 (refusing prevailing party status based on a preliminary
injunction).
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fees for preliminary injunctions, trial courts should analyze prevailing party
status based on the means by which a plaintiff obtains its desired result.220 A
means-based approach grants prevailing party status when a party obtains a
court order and the court order directly grants the party's desired result.22' Such
an approach is consistent with Buckhannon, is easily administrable, and
reconciles the circuit split created by Smyth and Watson.
Consistent with Buckhannon, courts can grant prevailing party status
based on a preliminary injunction by focusing on the means by which the party
obtained its desired result.12 As discussed above, Buckhannon overruled the
catalyst theory but did not expressly prohibit attorney's fees for a party that
obtained its desired result through a preliminary injunction.22a In Buckhannon,
the plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to attorney's fees because their
lawsuit brought about their desired result.22 The plaintiffs did not obtain the
result by court order, but instead obtained their desired result because their
lawsuit was a catalyst for a legislative response.225 Thus, the plaintiffs relied
upon the catalyst theory.2 6
A party that claims to be a prevailing party based on a preliminary
injunction is not always relying on the catalyst theory.227 If a plaintiff wins a
220. See Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (granting
prevailing party status because the court order granted the desired relief), cert. denied, 123 S.
Ct. 1574 (2003).
221. Whether accepting or denying the catalyst theory, courts have always required that a
prevailing party obtain its desired result. See, e.g., G.M. v. New Britain Bd. of Educ., 173 F.3d
77, 81-83 (2d Cir. 1999) (granting prevailing party status to plaintiff that obtained its desired
result); Ruocchhio v. United Transp. Union, Local 60, 181 F.3d 376,388 (3d Cir. 1999) (same);
Metro. Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters v. City of Pittsburgh, 964 F.2d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 1992)
(same); Shepard v. Sullivan, 898 F.2d 1267, 1271 (7th Cir. 1990) (same). When a plaintiff
relies on an interim order, it may be difficult for courts to determine when a party has obtained
its desired result because an interim order can be supplanted by a later ruling. For a discussion
of these difficulties, see infra Part IV.E (discussing special concerns under means-based
analysis when a party obtains its desired result by an interim order).
222. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (discussing court-ordered consent decrees and the requirements for
prevailing party status).
223. See id. at 605 (overruling the catalyst theory).
224. See id. at 601 (explaining the procedural history).
225. See id. (discussing the background facts).
226. See id. at 601 (explaining plaintiff's argument); see also Institutionalized Juveniles v.
Sec'y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 910-11 (3d Cir. 1985) (awarding attorney's fees based on
the catalyst theory); Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d 755, 758-59 (2d Cir. 1984) (same);
Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458,465-66 (5th Cir. 1981) (acknowledging that attorney's
fees can be awarded based on the catalyst theory).
227. See Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that
the award of attorney's fees for a party that wins a preliminary injunction does not depend on
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preliminary injunction, and because of the defendant's compliance with the
injunction the plaintiff obtains its desired result, the case does not implicate the
catalyst theory.22 The plaintiff obtained its desired result, not because its
lawsuit was a catalyst for the change in conduct, but because of a court order.229
By contrast, if a plaintiff wins a preliminary injunction and, subsequently, the
defendant voluntarily changes its conduct, reaches a settlement agreement, or
some third party (like a legislature) forces the desired change, the plaintiff must
depend on the catalyst theory despite having won a preliminary injunction.23 °
The plaintiff won a preliminary injunction, and the lawsuit engendered the
desired result, but the court did not grant it. 3'
Smyth and Watson illustrate the above distinction. In Smyth, the plaintiffs
relied on the catalyst theory, and in Watson they did not.232 In Watson, the
police department did not voluntarily exclude evidence of the police report at
the administrative hearing; the police department excluded the evidence
because the preliminary injunction required them to do so.233 By contrast, in
Smyth, the action became moot not because the preliminary injunction granted
plaintiffs the full relief they sought, but because their lawsuit led the
commissioner to obtain a waiver from HHS and redefine the paternity policy,
thereby exempting the plaintiffs. 234 Thus, in Smyth, the plaintiffs won a
the catalyst theory), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1574 (2003).
228. See id. (noting that plaintiffs recovery of attorney's fees did not depend on the
catalyst theory).
229. See id. ("In this case, the County was prohibited from introducing Watson's report at
the termination hearing for one reason and for one reason only: because Judge Timlin said
so.").
230. See Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2002) (denying prevailing party
status based on a preliminary injunction mooted by defendant's actions), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
825 (2002); Taylor v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 810 F.2d 1551, 1555-58 (11 th Cir. 1987)
(awarding attorney's fees for obtaining a preliminary injunction that became moot after a change
in a local ordinance); Rose v. Nebraska, 748 F.2d 1258, 1264 (8th Cir. 1984) (awarding
attorney's fees for obtaining a preliminary injunction that became moot after the legislature
amended the state statute); Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) (awarding attorney's fees after a preliminary injunction became moot because the police
abandoned the controversial policy).
231. See Smyth,.282 F.3d at 273 (considering a preliminary injunction that became moot);
Taylor, 810 F.2d at 1555 (same); Rose, 748 F.2d at 1260 (same); Williams, 625 F.2d at 847
(same).
232. Compare Smyth, 282 F.3d at 277 (refusing to grant prevailing party status to a party
that won a preliminary injunction) with Watson, 300 F.3d at 1096 (granting prevailing party
status to a party that won a preliminary injunction).
233. See Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that
plaintiff's relief stemmed from a court order), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1574 (2003).
234. See Smyth, 282 F.3d at 273 (describing the background of the litigation).
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preliminary injunction but obtained their desired result, not by court order, but
because their lawsuit was a catalyst for the desired change.235
A means-based analysis for determining prevailing party status is
consistent with Buckhannon because it denies attorney's fees to parties that rely
on the catalyst theory.236 The preliminary injunction serves as Buckhannon's
requisite judicial imprimatur, and the party that obtained its desired result has,
as Buckhannon requires, obtained a "material alteration of the legal relationship
of the parties necessary to permit an award of attorney's fees."2" If, however, a
party wins a preliminary injunction but ultimately obtains its desired result by
some external circumstance, i.e. through the catalyst theory, then the party has
not obtained the requisite judicial imprimatur. Therefore, a means-based
approach makes prevailing party status inappropriate when external
circumstances, rather than a court order, engender the desired result.23s
For similar reasons, a means-based approach reconciles Smyth and
Watson. Under a means-based approach, the Watson court correctly granted
prevailing party status, and the Smyth court correctly denied it. In Watson, the
plaintiff's desired result flowed directly from the preliminary injunction; the
plaintiff sought to keep evidence out of the administrative hearing, and the
preliminary injunction barred the evidence from the administrative hearing.239
Thus, the plaintiff won a preliminary injunction and the preliminary injunction
directly caused the plaintiff's desired result.24 Under a means-based approach,
prevailing party status was appropriate. In Smyth, however, the plaintiffs' suit
was a catalyst for the desired relief; the plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction
235. See id. (describing the facts).
236. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (overruling the catalyst theory); see also supra notes 227-35 and
accompanying text (distinguishing parties that win preliminary injunctions and rely on the
catalyst theory from parties that win preliminary injunctions and do not rely on the catalyst
theory). A means-based analysis for granting prevailing party status is also consistent with
Buckhannon's recognition that court-ordered consent decrees are sufficient for prevailing party
status. For a discussion of Buckhannon's recognition of court-ordered consent decrees, see
supra Part IV.A (comparing means- and merit-based methods of analyzing prevailing party
status).
237. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (citing Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch.
Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989)); see also Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist.,
489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989) (recognizing consent decrees as a valid basis for prevailing party
status).
238. See supra notes 227-35 and accompanying text (distinguishing preliminary
injunctions that rely on the catalyst theory from preliminary injunctions that do not). For a
discussion of the catalyst theory, see supra Part II.A (discussing the catalyst theory).
239. See Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (finding that the preliminary
injunction caused the exclusion of the written report), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1574 (2003).
240. See supra Part IV.D (describing the means-based test for prevailing party status).
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but obtained their relief from a private settlement with the Commissioner. 4'
Thus, the Smyth plaintiffs fail under a means-based test.
Finally, a means-based approach is consistent with the definition of
prevailing party in Black's Law Dictionary. Black's defines prevailing party as
"[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of
damages awarded.0 41 In deciding Buckhannon, the Supreme Court relied on
the above definition and noted that the catalyst theory was inconsistent with
Black's definition of a prevailing party because the catalyst theory does not
require that a plaintiff obtain a favorable judgment.4 3  The means-based
approach requires that a party's relief stem from a court order and thus
necessitates, consistent with Black's Law Dictionary, a favorable judgment
from a court.
E. Interim Relief and a Means-Based Approach
As Smyth demonstrates, winning a preliminary injunction will not
necessarily warrant prevailing party status under a means-based approach
because the preliminary injunction might not be a direct cause of the desired
result.2" A further difficulty for plaintiffs relying on a preliminary injunction
for prevailing party status is demonstrating when such plaintiffs obtained their
desired result. Frequently, a preliminary injunction constitutes only interim
relief.4 5 If a party wins a preliminary injunction and subsequently wins a
permanent injunction, the court should grant attorney's fees based on the
permanent, not the preliminary, injunction.246 Furthermore, if a party wins a
241. See Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 273 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating the facts), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002).
242. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999).
243. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (finding the catalyst theory inconsistent with the definition of
"prevailing party" in Black's Law Dictionary).
244. See McCafferty v. Local 254, Serv. Employees Int'l. Union, 186 F.3d 52,63 n.7 (1st
Cir. 1999) (denying attorney fees to party that won a preliminary injunction because of the
disparity between what plaintiff sought and what plaintiff received); see also supra notes 227-
35 and accompanying text (distinguishing preliminary injunctions that provide the desired result
from preliminary injunctions that do not).
245. See Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783,784-85 (9th Cir. 2002)
(granting a preliminary injunction but denying a permanent injunction); Idaho Watersheds
Project v. Hahn, 307 F.3d 815, 816 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying a preliminary injunction but
granting a permanent injunction); Reynolds v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11 th Cir. 2000)
(granting a preliminary injunction but denying a permanent injunction).
246. See Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 221 (2d Cir. 2003)
(basing prevailing party status on a permanent injunction when plaintiff had previously won a
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preliminary injunction, and the court ultimately denies the permanent
injunction, then the party did not obtain its desired result, did not prevail, and
should not receive attorney's fees.247 A preliminary injunction is not a suitable
basis for prevailing party status when a later decision or dissolution will
supplant the preliminary injunction.4 8 Thus, a court should base prevailing
party status on a preliminary injunction only when the court determines that the
underlying action is moot and that a further ruling in the same case will not
jeopardize the outcome.249
F. The Defendant's Ability to Voluntarily Moot the Action
Perhaps the biggest drawback of a means-based approach is that the
approach does not prevent defendants from voluntarily mooting an action to
avoid paying the plaintiff's attorney's fees.2"' Defendants could lose a
preliminary injunction, reason their odds of losing a permanent injunction are
high, and elect to desist in their offensive conduct, thereby mooting the action
and avoiding a judgment for attorney's fees.25 ' In such situations, attorney's
fees would be inappropriate under a means-based approach because the desired
result will have stemmed from the defendant's voluntary change in conduct and
not from the preliminary injunction.252
preliminary injunction); Tarnko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23,30 (1st
Cir. 2002) (same).
247. See LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68,69 (2d Cir. 1994) (denying prevailing party status
to a party that won a preliminary injunction but lost an appeal on the merits); Christopher P. v.
Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 804-05 (2d Cir. 1990) (ruling that plaintiff who won a preliminary
injunction to maintain the status quo was not a prevailing party when plaintiff lost its appeal on
the merits).
248. See, e.g., Patsy's Brand, 317 F.3d at 221 (basing prevailing party status on a
permanent injunction when plaintiff had previously won a preliminary injunction); Tamko
Roofing Prods., 282 F.3d at 30-31 (same); LaRouche, 20 F.3d at 69 (denying prevailing party
status to a party that won a preliminary injunction but lost an appeal on the merits); Christopher
P., 915 F.2d at 804-05 (ruling that a plaintiff who won a preliminary injunction to maintain the
status quo was not a prevailing party when plaintiff ultimately lost on the merits).
249. The basic test for mootness is whether the relief sought would, if decided in the
plaintiff's favor, make a difference to the legal interest of the parties. See Markva v. Haveman,
317 F.3d 547, 557 (6th Cir. 2003) (defining the test for mootness); Green v. Nevers, 196 F.3d
627, 632 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); Garcia v. Lawn, 805 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
250. See supra Part l1.D (discussing criticisms of Buckhannon).
251. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 622-23 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion).
252. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the means-based approach to prevailing party status).
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The defendant's ability to voluntarily moot an action is one of the most
common criticisms of Buckhannon.2" This ability can lead to a denial of
attorney's fees for plaintiffs, not because the plaintiffs' cases lack merit, but
simply because the defendant mooted the action before the court could make a
final ruling."" Furthermore, the ability creates an incentive for plaintiffs to add
a claim for damages simply to prevent the defendant from voluntarily mooting
the action.2" Relying on a means-based analysis does not obviate these
concerns.
The Supreme Court could prevent defendants from voluntarily mooting an
action by overruling Buckhannon and reinstating the catalyst theory. Under the
catalyst theory, a plaintiff would recover attorney's fees if the defendant
voluntarily changed its conduct, provided the change in conduct was induced
by the lawsuit.2"6 Overruling Buckhannon would, however, reinstate the
drawbacks that led the Supreme Court to overrule the catalyst theory. Most
notably, plaintiffs would be able to recover attorney's fees without any judicial
consideration of their claim.25 7
Courts could more effectively prevent defendants from voluntarily
mooting actions by refining the means-based approach with a limited version of
the merit-based approach. In general, prevailing party status would be
appropriate only under the means-based approach. Courts could, however,
allow attorney's fees to a party when (1) the party wins a preliminary
injunction, (2) the defendant voluntarily moots the action, and (3) the trial
judge determines that the plaintiff made a sufficient showing on the merits.
This approach addresses the Supreme Court's concerns in Buckhannon-a
party could not be a prevailing party without a judicial ruling and a judicial
finding that the suit had sufficient merit-and limits the defendant's ability to
block attorney's fees by voluntarily changing its conduct.
253. See Dunn, supra note 76, at I (describing strategies to circumnavigate Buckhannon).
254. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the effect
of a majority decision).
255. See Dunn, supra note 76, at I (describing strategies to circumnavigate Buckhannon).
256. See, e.g., Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec'y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897,910-11
(3d Cir. 1985) (applying the catalyst theory); Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d 755, 758-59
(2d Cir. 1984) (same); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1981) (same);
Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979) (same), overruled by S-I and S-2 v. State
Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275,279-80
(Ist Cir. 1978) (same), called into doubt by Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001); see also supra Part II.A (discussing the
catalyst theory).
257. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (overruling the catalyst theory).
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However, reliance--even on a limited merit-based approach--does
involve the drawbacks discussed above regarding the merit-based approach. 58
The judicial finding on the merits would be speculative because the judge
would not have the benefit of a full trial, judges would have to make additional
findings, and any threshold established for whether the party demonstrated
sufficient merits would necessarily be arbitrary.' 9 These concerns, however,
are less troublesome if courts follow the merit-based approach only when a
defendant voluntarily changes its conduct after the plaintiff wins a preliminary
injunction and demonstrates sufficient merits. In such a situation, the need to
prevent the defendant from voluntarily mooting an action outweighs the
difficulties inherent in a merit-based approach.
V. Conclusion
Buckhannon overruled the catalyst theory and required a judicial
imprimatur for prevailing party status.2" It is unclear from Buckhannon
whether the imprimatur is satisfied by judicial recognition on the merits of the
plaintiff's claim, or whether the imprimatur is satisfied when the plaintiff
obtains its desired result by means of a court order. A close reading of
Buckhannon and various policy considerations favor the means-based
approach.26' Under a means-based approach, courts should grant prevailing
party status when a party obtains a court order and the court order grants the
party's desired relief.262 If the relief is in the form of a preliminary injunction,
the court must also be convinced that the action is moot and the relief will not
be supplanted or dissolved by subsequent judicial action.263
Despite its advantages over a merit-based approach, the means-based
approach does not prevent defendants from voluntarily mooting an action to
avoid paying the plaintiff's attorney's fees.2' A court can negate this power by
awarding attorney's fees under a merit-based approach when a plaintiff
(1) wins a preliminary injunction, in so doing, (2) demonstrates a sufficient
likelihood of success on the merits, and (3) the defendant moots the lawsuit by
258. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the drawbacks to the merit-based approach).
259. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the drawbacks to the merit-based approach).
260. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (overruling the catalyst theory).
261. See supra Part IV (comparing the means and merit-based approaches for granting
prevailing party status).
262. See supra Part IV.D (analyzing the means-based approach).
263. See supra Part IV.E (discussing the interim nature of preliminary injunctions).
264. See supra Part IV.F (addressing defendant's ability to voluntarily moot an action).
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voluntarily changing its conduct. 65 Thus, a plaintiff receives the "necessary
judicial imprimatur" when the plaintiff obtains its desired result by a court
order, or in limited circumstances, when the plaintiff obtains a court order that
involves sufficient recognition on the merits of the plaintiff's claim.
265. See supra Part IV.F (discussing defendant's ability to voluntarily moot an action).
